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Abstract 
The relationship between emerging economies and developed economies via 
multinational corporations is investigated. Using newly constructed database, it is 
shown that corporate expansion during the past decade has been dominated by 
M&As and characterized by developed countries financial institutions’ penetration 
into the emerging economies. European financial companies have experienced the 
fastest growth rates and together with US firms account for about 80% of the 
world’s largest enterprises. This expansion has resulted in cheap financing for 
small enterprises with local knowledge of the market in emerging economies that 
has resulted in their stocks’ outperformance since the beginning of the previous 
credit easing cycle (2001). As banking industry as a funding source is no longer 
available for small enterprises in emerging markets, this trend is expected to 
reverse. On the contrary, large multinational companies have access to cheap 
financing at home (where securitization markets are more developed) and 
internationally (economies of scale). This should allow large multinational 
enterprises to expand further in size by increasing their market share. 
Implications for the US economy are presented in Appendix. 
JEL Classification: F01, F21, F23, G34 
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Introduction 
In 2005, Ben Bernanke (current Federal Reserve Chairman) asked logical 
question: why was the United Stated, the world largest economy, borrowing 
heavily on international capital markets – rather than lending, as would seem 
more natural. He argued that over the past decade, the combination of diverse 
forces has created a significant increase in global supply of savings – a global 
savings glut which helps to explain both the increase in the U.S. current account 
deficit and the relatively low level of long term interest rates in the world. Where 
did the savings to the US came from? The answer to this question comes from 
historical perspective and is related to the remarkable change in the current 
account balances of developing countries. Developing countries experienced a 
series of deep financial crisis in the past decades. In the mid – 1990s, most 
developing countries were net importers of capital. These capital inflows were not 
always productively used (in fact, most often they were used unproductively). In 
some cases, for example, developing-country governments borrowed to avoid 
necessary fiscal consolidation; in other cases opaque and poorly governed banking 
system failed to allocate these funds to the projects promising the highest returns. 
Loss of confidence, together with other factors such as overvalued fixed exchange 
rates and debt that was both short-term and denominated in foreign currencies, 
ultimately culminated in painful financial crises, including those in Mexico in 
1994, in a number of East Asian countries in 1997-98, in Russia, in Brazil in 1999, 
and in Argentina in 2002. The effect of these crisis included rapid capital outflows, 
currency depreciation, sharp declines in domestic asset prices, weakened banking 
system, and recession. In response to these events, emerging market (EM) nations 
either chose or were forced into new strategies for managing international capital 
flows. In general, these strategies involved shifting from being net importers of 
capital to being net exporters. In practice, these countries increased reserves 
through the expedient of issuing debt to their local citizens, thereby mobilizing 
domestic savings, and then using the proceeds to buy various high grade fixed 
income securities (U.S. Treasuries, High grade corporate debt, etc.). Effectively, 
governments have acted as financial intermediaries, channeling domestic saving 
away from local uses and into international capital markets. The development and 
adoption of new technologies and raising productivity in the US and EU, together 
with long standing advantages such as low political risk, strong property rights 
and good regulatory environment, made the developed country economies 
exceptionally attractive to international investors. 
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Productivity and global ageing 
Populations of most industrial countries are both growing slowly and ageing 
rapidly. As a result, many of the industrial countries have strong reasons to save 
(to help support future retirees) as well as limited investment opportunities at 
home (because workforces are shrinking and capital-labor ratios are already high). 
In contrast, most developing countries have younger and more rapidly growing 
workforces, as well as low capital to labor ratios, conditions that imply that returns 
to capital in those countries may potentially be quite high. 
Current financial architect 
There is another factor that played a role in influencing the level of global 
availability of capital. The growing inequality characterizing an unregulated 
capitalism, in which wages stagnate while productivity and profits raise, has 
resulted in the accumulation of vast sums of capital in the hands of a few investors 
in the metropolitan centre of global capitalism1. These gains are lightly taxed by 
governments that are not committed to appropriating a part of the surpluses of the 
rich to improve the welfare of the poor. Lower down the ladder, investment capital 
accumulates with mutual funds and pension funds in which less protected 
populations deposit the savings they put aside to insure their future. The decline of 
state-funded welfare in today’s more liberalized and open capitalism is forcing the 
middle class in the developed countries to save by subscribing to these funds that 
have become important sources of financial capital. EM savings rates are even 
higher as social security net is either inexistent or very limited2. 
Commodity prices 
Oil price surge resulted in increased foreign reserves which have served as a 
funding vehicle. Chandrasekhar (2008) found very tight correlation between build 
up of global liquidity and oil price. Lending to EM from early 1970s to 1982, fuelled 
by petrodollar recycling which was the result of end of Bretton Woods era and free 
convertibility, i.e. depreciation of USD versus commodities as a result of loose 
monetary policy in the US, led to increase in banking liabilities (deposits) that 
have been recycled back to EM via loans. Today high commodity prices resulted in 
accumulation of foreign reserves which serve as a funding sources for expansion of 
global corporations to EM. In other words, when capital comes via lending but not 
supported by entity (multinational enterprise), it is most probably utilized 
                                                          
1 For example the wealthiest 1% of Americans reportedly earned 21,2 % of all incomes in 2005, according to data from 
Internal Revenue Service. This was an increase from 19% in 2004 and more than 20,8% in 2000, at the peak of the previous 
bull market in stocks. Compared with this, the bottom 50% earned 12,8% of all incomes in 2005, which was less than 13,4% 
and 13% in 2004 and 2000 respectively. Heathcote, Perri and Giovanni (2009) find large and steady increase in wage 
inequality between 1967 and 2006. 
2 Savings rate in China is close to 30% of disposable income (Barnett and Brooks (2010)). 
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ineffectively. When this capital comes with corporation managing it, efficiency is 
increased. 
Reverse flows 
In sum, the capital flows to the country that can employ it more efficiently. In 
other words capital flows to US are employed more efficiently. It then gets recycled 
back to emerging markets (EM) via multinational companies with their know-how, 
technology and expertise3. The reverse flow of capital essentially means that excess 
savings in EM are being “recycled” in ways that puts the responsibility of 
allocating that capital in the hands of a few financial decision makers at the apex 
of global concentrated financial system. For example, in the wake of China’s 
decision to invest part of its foreign exchange surpluses in funds managed by 
Blackstone (private equity group), much of this capital flowed back as investment 
into firms located in China itself. More recently, much has been made of the rise of 
SVF (Sovereign Wealth Funds) in developing countries, like China Investment 
Corporation, that are seen as a challenge to financial institutions from the 
developed countries, especially the US and UK, which have traditionally 
dominated global finance. However, a significant part of investments by these SWF 
is in global financial intermediaries or the funds they manage. This expansion of 
multinational companies has positive implications for the developed country 
economy as discussed in Appendix II. 
Empirical tests 
Series of regression tests on companies with benchmark year 1995 and benchmark 
year 2000 (to account for possible structural shift due to lowering of the Federal 
Funds Target rate in 2001) are performed. Companies are compared according to 
their Enterprise Value (EV) to account for both debt and equity components. We 
range companies according to their EV within the following subgroups: largest 500 
companies according to EV; largest 500 companies with EV below USD5 bil.; 
largest 500 companies with EV below USD1 bil.; largest 500 companies with EV 
below USD200 mio.; largest 500 companies with EV below USD50 mio. As can be 
seen from Table 1 below, company within larger subgroup tended to grow slower 
that company in subsequent smaller subgroup within all subgroups. This is valid 
for both 1995 and 2000 benchmark years, respectively. 
                                                          
3 For example, it has been shown that less than 9% of patents in US firms come from research conducted abroad (Doz, 
Santos, & Williamson, 2001) 
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The sample is then adjusted by taking top 500 companies according to EV in years 
2001 - 2009. Companies are arranged according to their EV within the following 
subgroups: largest 500 companies according to EV; largest 500 companies with EV 
below USD5 bil.; largest 500 companies with EV below USD1 bil.; largest 500 
companies with EV below USD200 mio.; largest 500 companies with EV below 
USD50 mio. However, the benchmark for the year is not set and therefore analysis 
does not follow the evolution of the fixed number of companies starting from the 
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base year. Differently put, there is no benchmark year for data selection and every 
time different companies are compared. The results are presented below. As can be 
seen from Table 3, results yield to opposite conclusion, suggesting that larger 
companies tend to grow faster than smaller companies. We increased the sample 
size up to 1500 companies within each subgroup but general trend remains the 
same. 
 
What is the explanation that can account for such a dramatic difference between 
two approaches? Results presented in Tables 1,2 suggest that organic growth in 
smaller companies tend to be higher. However, organic growth is not the only 
source of growth. Closer analysis of companies in benchmark years (1995 and 2000 
respectively) and companies in the year 2009 brings the following conclusion: the 
subset of the sample has significantly changed, i.e. new companies have emerged 
or moved from one subgroup to another. This leads to the conclusion that large 
part of deviation between the different approaches might come from M&A activity, 
where industry consolidation, cross border activity plays crucial role determining 
company sizes. 
Global liquidity and financial flows to EM 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) is important vehicle to bring goods and services 
to foreign markets. FDI involves the transfer of a package of assets or intermediate 
products, which include financial capital, management and organizational 
expertise, technology, entrepreneurship, incentive structures, values and cultural 
norms, and access to markets across national boundaries. According to UNCTAD 
(2006), in 2004, the foreign assets of the top 100 non-financial MNEs accounted for 
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46% of global outward FDI stock4. However, one noticeable trend is that sales and 
purchases of cross border M&A has been, by far, dominated by finance related 
companies. Asia was the largest recipients of FDI flows (Dunning and Lundan 
(2008)). At the time of the East Asian crisis (mid-1997), the international asset 
position of banks resident in 23 countries reporting to the Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS) stood at $9.95 trillion, involving $8.6 trillion in external assets 
after adjusting for local assets in international currencies (BIS, 1997). By June 
2007, when 40 countries were reporting, this had risen to $33.71 trillion, with 
external assets totaling $29.98 trillion (BIS, 2007a). For example, the international 
assets of the United Kingdom-based banks had increased from $1.5 trillion to $6.1 
trillion, and that of the United States banks from $0.74 trillion to $2.8 trillion. 
This massive expansion of finance capital has been accompanied by a substantial 
increase in capital flows to developing countries. Net external financing flows 
which had fallen from $360.1 billion in 1997 to $173.5 billion in 2002, have since 
risen sharply to $785.5 billion in 2006. While foreign direct and portfolio 
investment increased from $153.8 billion in 2002 to $446.7 billion in 2006, net 
external borrowing rose from $10.9 billion in 2001 to 294.5 billion in 2006. Thus, 
underlying the surge was an expansion in both investment and debt flows to 
developing countries. Two features considered reassuring are, first, the large and 
dominant share of non-debt creating investment flows and, second, the dominance 
of foreign direct investment over foreign portfolio investment in equity flows. 
Dunning and Lundan (2008) found that there is reason to believe that the capital 
flows to developing countries were driven more by supply-side push factors, rather 
than developing country demand. It is undoubtedly true that this capital could not 
have crossed borders without relaxed regulations regarding the inflow of foreign 
equity and debt in the developing countries. But liberalization has not ensured 
large inflows either in all countries or at all times. It appears that an expansion of 
liquidity in the international financial system has driven funds into emerging 
markets, as it did before the debt crisis in the early 1980s and the East Asian crisis 
in 1997. With growing financial liberalization in the developing world, it was 
inevitable that this process would affect developing countries as well. The process 
of expansion was supported by low interest rates policy of the US (and EU). As a 
result, the combination of a depressed cost of capital and buoyant corporate 
profitability made it smart to borrow and buy earnings stream. As can be seen 
from below, the largest companies origin in USA or Western Europe. Among them, 
the largest share is in financial industry which also had experienced the largest 
growth rate during the last decade. 
                                                          
4 World annual FDI inflows rose from an average of $50 billion during 1981-1985 to $1.9 trillion in 2007. By the end of 2007, 
world FDI flows has accumulated to a stock of $15 trillion, controlled over 80 000 multinational enterprises that have more 
than 800000 foreign affiliates. 
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Discussion 
Since 1980s increased globalization has changed global corporate architecture 
significantly. Developed countries’ enterprises have outsourced their production 
abroad where labor is cheaper and return to capital is higher. While organic 
growth of larger companies has been smaller, adjusted for consolidation and M&A 
activity, the growth has actually been larger. The 1990’s and early 2000’s saw a 
tremendous increase in the volume of cross border mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As). A new and important aspect of these M&As is that a significant number 
of the firms that are acquired or are merged with are from emerging economies. 
Piotroski and Srinivasan (2007) and Li (2007) have shown that the cross-listings of 
foreign firms in the U.S. have declined considerably. This is the case especially 
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those from emerging capital markets. This suggests that foreign firms that are 
seeking access to U.S. capital markets will be more likely to agree to be acquired 
by a U.S. corporation. This implies that M&As will become increasingly important 
over time for firms to access U.S. capital markets especially those from emerging 
markets. Francis and Hasan (2008) find that one of the main reasons for the 
increase in cross border acquisitions by U.S. firms, especially to emerging markets, 
is to provide funding to financially constrained firms either through internal 
capital markets or indirectly through access to external capital markets. By 
overcoming these financial constraints these firms are then able to undertake 
positive NPV projects which would otherwise have been forgone. An additional 
trend in recent cross-border M&As is that, increasingly large reputable 
multinational corporations such as Cisco, Microsoft, GE, Coca-Cola, AOL and 
Pfizer, among others are actively involved in these M&As. This indicates that not 
only has the volume of M&As increased over time but acquirer characteristics have 
also changed. The implication of this is that the wealth effects of cross-border 
transactions may be significantly different than those observed for the earlier time 
periods. For example, if in fact synergy is created following cross-border 
acquisitions, it may be even stronger among these large acquirers because they are 
more likely to have cheaper access to external capital markets and/or may already 
have a well functioning internal capital market. Francis and Hasan (2008) find 
that for firms taking over emerging market targets, changes in both the raw and 
industry-adjusted operating performance are significantly higher than those of the 
firms taking over developed market targets. This is especially the case for large 
bidders. In contrast, for small bidders, the results from the operating performance 
analysis indicate that they experience significant operating performance decrease 
in the long-run no matter which market they enter. Inter sum, they find that cross-
border M&As create value for U.S. firms especially over the 1996-border 2003 time 
period, with most of this gain coming from acquisitions of emerging market 
targets. Results are consistent with the hypothesis that an important source of this 
value creation is that the merged firm provides access to cheaper external capital. 
Conclusion 
Developed country financial sector penetration in EM has been higher than other 
non-financial sector companies’ penetration in EM. This has in turn guaranteed 
easy access of EM small-caps to financial resources in order to discover market 
inefficiency and earn abnormal returns. As bank financing is no longer available in 
EM, this source of growth has been ceased. However, unlike large multinational 
companies, their access to securitization, market is practically inexistent. As can 
be seen from Graph 3, debt issuance in EM has already hit 10 year low relative to 
developed country issuance (compulsory rollover of debt is included, however, we 
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do not distinguish between new issuance in previous debt roll over issuance). This 
is somewhat offset by increased proportion in issuance of local denominated debt 
(Graph 4, 5), however the cost of such debt is higher which yet again places small 
EM), companies in another disadvantage to global corporations.  
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Based on the presented analysis, there is high probability in reverse of the trend 
that has been prevailing for the last decade with large developed country 
multinational companies growing slower than EM small capitalization stocks. In 
other words the reversal of the trend in the Graph 6 is expected. Among largest 
multinational companies, US and Western Europe companies account for around 
80% of total (Graph 2, regression results presented in Appendix I). European 
companies have been growing faster than US companies, however, one have to 
distinguish between quality and quantity growth. Most of the growth has been 
done via financial sector, therefore final allocation of resources has been 
outsourced (bank lending). This might be associated with increased risks of capital 
loss (NPLs). 
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APPENDIX I 
Comparing growth rates among companies from different regions yields the 
following results: 
 
As can be seen from regression analysis, growth rate of European companies has 
been faster than that of the rest subgroup. These results are compliance with 
findings of Dunning and Lundan (2008). They found that although the US 
continues to be by far the largest outward direct investor, its share of the world 
direct capital stock over the past four decades has steadily fallen from 47% in 1960 
to 42% in 1980, 24% in 1990 and 19% in 2005. In 1962, the US accounted for 61% 
of the 500 largest industrial companies in the world, while in 1982 it accounted for 
44% (Dunning and Pearce (1985)). In the Fortune Global 500 list of 2006, US firms 
were still the most numerous, although they accounted for only 34% of the total. 
Between 1973 and 2002, the four main European investors (the UK, Germany, the 
Netherlands and France) and Japan accounted for 43% of the accumulated stock of 
FDI compared with only 30% in 1973. Another feature of the outward FDI stock 
data is the sharp increase in the rate of growth of the stake of several smaller 
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developed countries. For example, between 1990 and 2002, Denmark, Austria, 
Israel and Portugal each more than doubled their share. Trends in outward 
investment flows tell the same story. There is continuing relative decline of the US 
as a major outward investor, and a sharp increase in the significance of some EU 
investors, such as the UK, France, Spain and Belgium/Luxembourg. 
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APPENDIX II 
Implications for the US economy: 
In what follows, to the structure of gross assets and liabilities and their evolution 
over time is analyzed. This structure is particularly interesting in the case of the 
US, which has been the center country of the Bretton Woods system since 1944 
and has remained the most important financial center in the world, even after the 
collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime. The US has succeeded the United 
Kingdom as the ‘Banker of the World’ and the issuer of the main international 
currency. This means in particular being able to borrow short (foreigners are 
willing to purchase liquid dollar assets) and lend long (the US supplies long-term 
loans and investment funds to foreign enterprises). Just like a bank, the US can 
extract an intermediation margin, given by the (positive) return differential 
between external assets and liabilities. During the whole period, US assets have 
shifted more and more out of long term bank loans towards FDI and, since the 
1990s, towards FDI and equity. At the same time, its liabilities have remained 
dominated by bank loans, trade credit and debt, i.e. low yield safe assets. Hence 
the US balance sheet resembles increasingly one of a venture capitalist with high 
return risky investments on the asset side. Furthermore, its leverage ratio has 
increased sizably over time. During the 1960s, the US was running moderate 
current account surpluses but was investing sizable amounts abroad in the form of 
FDI. The share of FDI steadily increased between 1952 and 1973, from zero to 40% 
of gross external asset positions. On 4 February 1965 the French president de 
Gaulle famously complained in a press conference at the Elys´ee Palace that an 
increase in the US money supply was leading to increased capital outflows from 
the US and “for some countries to a sort of expropriation of their enterprises.” For 
de Gaulle, the role of the dollar as the international currency meant that the US 
could borrow money from the rest of the world “free of charge.” By printing dollars 
and using them to purchase foreign companies, it was claimed, the US was abusing 
its hegemonic position at the center of the international monetary system. But 
these long - term capital outflows led to a continuous drain of the US gold reserves, 
despite the numerous and futile attempts by the US to limit the size of the balance 
of payments deficit. The abandonment of gold parity, however, did not lead to the 
demise of the dollar as the main international currency. The US has remained the 
world liquidity provider ever since. The share of risky assets in total assets 
increased continuously during the Bretton Woods era, as growing FDI outflows led 
to a decrease in gold reserves. This gold drain was stopped in 1973 once the Nixon 
Administration decided to end the convertibility of the dollar. After the emerging 
market debt crisis of the 1980s and the deregulation of equity markets of the 
1990s, the growth in FDI and portfolio equity flows gathered pace ever since. In 
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sum, an important difference in the composition of stocks is that the US holds 
more direct investment assets, which have a higher rate of return than the fixed-
income debt that makes up the stock of US liabilities. This upward trend in the 
share of high yielding risky assets is consistent with the increase over time of the 
(positive) return differential between assets and liabilities. And even though we 
can observe the raising cost of the interest payments on the growing US public 
debt, which has been increasingly held by foreigners, it is compensated by even 
faster rise in the income generated by FDI5. The US net investment income 
balance (Graph 1) — earnings on US owned assets abroad minus payments on 
foreign-owned assets in the US— has been running positive despite the large and 
growing net external debt position—the stock of US owned assets overseas minus 
the stock of foreign-owned assets domestically (Graph 1).  
 
 
The stock of foreign assets in the US has grown faster than the stock of US assets 
abroad and by the end of 2008 exceeded the stock of US assets abroad by 17% 
(Graph 2). While the US investment position balance has become increasingly 
negative over time, the investment income balance has remained positive and 
actually trended upward over much of the past decade. 
                                                          
5 According to Gourichas and Ray (2005), the post Bretton Woods average asset return for US is 6,82% while corresponding 
total liability return is 3.5%. According to Deutche Bank, the excess return ranged between 1-2% since 1976 (always 
positive). 
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The long-standing relationship between a negative US investment position and a 
positive US income balance is due to a higher rate of return on US assets abroad 
than on foreign assets in the US. The increase in the level of US debt will 
eventually outweigh the rate-of- return differential as risk premium will raise, 
however no research has been able to detect the threshold level of that debt. In 
sum, the performance of US multinational enterprises has played an important 
role in reducing the size of the CA deficit. The continued surplus on capital income 
which represents the receipts of income by U.S. parents from their foreign 
affiliates less payments of income to the foreign parents of their affiliates in the 
US, has in part compensated for the deficit in goods, and thus reduced the burden 
of external debt liabilities. The positive balance on services, particularly on 
royalties and license fees and other private services, have also helped to offset the 
deficit in goods. Mihir and Fritz (2008) find evidence that there is a strong positive 
correlation between the domestic and foreign activity levels of multinational firms. 
Their results imply that 10 percent greater foreign capital investment triggers 2.6 
percent of additional domestic capital investment, and that 10 percent greater 
foreign employee compensation is associated with 3.7 percent greater domestic 
employee compensation. There are similar positive relationships between foreign 
and domestic changes in assets, and numbers of employees. There are several 
channels through which foreign activities can influence the scope of domestic 
operations, including cases in which foreign production requires inputs of tangible 
or intellectual property produced in the home country. The estimates indicate that 
greater foreign activity is associated with higher exports from U.S. parent 
companies to their foreign affiliates and is also associated with greater domestic 
R&D spending. In sum, across all of these measures of multinational firm activity, 
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the regression analysis suggests that increased foreign activity is associated with 
greater domestic activity. Increasing factory productivity has kept America the 
world’s largest industrial economy, accounting for more than one-fifth of global 
output, almost twice as much as China, according to United Nations. Raising 
productivity also means companies need fewer workers. The number of Americans 
employed in factories has fallen 40% since peaking in 1979, according to Labor 
Department. The reality is that manufacturing employs a mere 11,5 million 
workers in the US, or 9% of the labor force. Surprisingly, there are 7.7 million 
people in financial services, which is not much if we compare the size of financial 
company size to the rest dataset. The point is that you don’t need many people to 
operate large bank, however the return on assets (ROA) can be significantly 
higher6. While productivity has played a major role, the US has also moved up the 
manufacturing ladder, creating and making more sophisticated, technologically 
advanced goods while losing low-skill, lower- value industries, such as toys and 
textiles, to countries where wages are a fraction of those in America. Indeed, there 
has been a change in the composition of US trading partners towards low-price 
producers. From this perspective EM workers are complements rather than 
substitutes for developed country workers. Their (EM) joining the global labor pool 
reduces the prices of the manufacturing goods the developed country buys and 
raises the demand and prices for high-tech goods and services developed country 
sells, which benefits educated labor and raises the pace of technological advance. 
The slower the spread of new technology to low wage countries, the higher paid are 
developed country workers compared to workers in developing countries. As 
Ferguson and Schularick (2009) report, Chinese unit labor costs today are about 
25% lower than in 1998 (in dollar terms). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 Around 40% of corporate earnings in US come from financial sector. 
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